Whereas Emile Durkheim (1858Durkheim ( -1917 has long been envisioned as a structuralist, quantitative, and positivist sociologist, some materials that Durkheim produced in the later stages of his career-namely, Moral Education (1961Education ( [1902Education ( -1903), The Evolution of Educational Thought (1977Thought ( [1904Thought ( -1905
I ronically, one of the most consequential statements on "pragmatist" or "social realist" thought in Germany was developed by the French scholar Emile Durkheim (1993 Durkheim ( [1887 ). Although cast in reference to "the scientific study of morality" rather than "social realism" or "pragmatism" per se, Durkheim contends that several German scholars, of whom Wilhelm Wundt is most consequential, had developed an especially promising, interrelated set of approaches for studying community life in the social sciences. Still, Durkheim was unable and/or did not consider it appropriate to openly stress his indebtedness to the German social realists when pursuing his career as a French academic.
Thus, it is only later, as a more established scholar, 1 The page references in this paper to Emile Durkheim's "La Science Positive de la Morale en Allemagne" ["The Scientific Study of Morality in Germany"] are from Robert T. Hall's English translation-as found on pages 57-135 of Hall's (1993) Emile Durkheim: Ethics and the Sociology of Morals [E&SM] . I am very much indebted to Robert Hall for his translation and exceptionally insightful introduction to this text. Indeed, of the various commentators on Durkheim's works, it is Robert T. Hall who has most centrally grasped the importance of this 1887 statement for Durkheim's subsequent scholarship. that Durkheim (1902 Durkheim ( -1914 In what follows, I consider the implications of a study leave in Germany taken by Emile Durkheim in 1885-1886 for the humanist/pragmatist sociology that would become prominent in Durkheim's later scholarly works (1915 [1912]; 1961 [1902-1903]; 1977 [1904-1905];1983 [1913-1914] ). In developing this statement, I build on Durkheim's (1993 Durkheim's ( [1887 ) article, "La Science Positive de la Morale en Allemagne" ("The Scientific Study of Morality in Germany") which appears in Robert T. Hall 2 In an attempt to succinctly capture the overarching essence of Durkheim's 1887 statement, Robert Alun Jones (1985; 1994; 1999; 2002) uses the term "social realism." This seems entirely appropriate to me, especially since it reminds readers of the particular cultural context in which Durkheim's statement was developed.
Nonetheless, readers are advised that in this paper I am using the terms "social realism," "social pragmatism," and "pragmatism" in essentially interchangeable ways. Durkheim does not use any of these terms in his 1887 statement, but readers will recognize considerable overall affinity between these approaches to the study of human knowing, acting, and interchange and the concepts embedded in the specific articles Emile Durkheim discusses in the 1887 paper. In addition to earlier discussions of "folk psychology" (die Völkerpsychologie) in German scholarship, the term "social realism" as used herein has many conceptual affinities with Aristotelian social thought (especially see Nicomachean Ethics and Rhetoric), as well as with what would later become known as American pragmatism, symbolic interactionism, social constructionism, interpretivism, and phenomenological sociology (see : Prus 1996; 2003; 2004; 2007a; 2007b; 2008; 2009a; 2009b; 2013a; 2015; 2017) . Most centrally, following Wilhelm Wundt (Ethics), Durkheim's emphasis is on studying the developmentally shaped, collectively enacted, and linguistically enabled conceptual foundations of community life. It is within the context of ongoing human life-worlds that all realms and instances of human knowing, acting, and interchange become meaningful and achieve some historically constituted continuity. Envisioned thusly, Emile Durkheim's depiction of "the social realist study of morality" represents an exceptionally enabling prototype for the study of all contexts and arenas of human group life.
Few sociologists seem familiar with Durkheim's 1887 statement and even fewer have considered the implications of Durkheim's encounter with "German social realism" (Jones 1999 ) during a study leave as a junior scholar-either for Durkheim's career as a sociologist or for the field of sociology and the study of human knowing and acting more specifically. Relatedly, this much overlooked statement also (d) alerts us to the role that some German scholars (especially Wilhelm Wundt) played in the development of In developing this statement on Durkheim's encounter with German social realism, I also benefited from Robert Alun Jones' (1999) insightful historical commentary on Durkheim's career as a scholar-and in particular Jones' attentiveness to the contributions of Wilhelm Wundt to Durkheim's 1887 statement on the study of morality in Germany. While I am particularly grateful to Steven Lukes (1973) for the broad array of materials that he provides on Durkheim's scholarly career and publications, Lukes substantially understates the importance of Durkheim's encounter with German realism, as well as the humanist/pragmatist proclivities one encounters in Emile Durkheim's later works. Although providing an exceptionally extensive and highly detailed depiction of Durkheim's personal life and career, Marcel Fournier's (2013) biographical statement on Emile Durkheim also gives very little attention to what I have termed Durkheim's "sociological pragmatism" in his 1887 paper or in his later works (1902) (1903) (1904) (1905) (1906) (1907) (1908) (1909) (1910) (1911) (1912) (1913) (1914) . Fournier acknowledges Durkheim's subsequent attentiveness to history and ethnography as central features of the sociological enterprise in some of his later work, but, much like Lukes, Fournier is inattentive to the historical continuities of pragmatist Greek thought (from Aristotle via Wundt) in Durkheim's "The Scientific Study of Morality in Germany." proach to the study of human group life and (e) denotes another set of connections between classical Greek scholarship and contemporary pragmatist thought.
It is commonly assumed that Durkheim's sociology was primarily inspired by the positivist philosophy of Auguste Comte (1798 Comte ( -1857 . Indeed, Durkheim's best-known works (The Division of Labor in Society [1893] , The Rules of Sociological Method [1895] , and Suicide [1897] ) represent a structural-determinist, as well as a quantitative alternative (Suicide) to interpretivist/ pragmatist viewpoints. Likewise, whereas one can locate some pragmatist themes in these three texts, emphases of these latter sorts generally have been envisioned as distinctively theoretically and methodologically marginal to his overall project.
Still, even though Durkheim's best-known texts (1947 [1893]; 1951 [1897]; 1958 [1895] ) are noted for their structuralist, quantitative, and deductively rationalist emphases, it is likely that these texts also would have been more positivist, individualistic, and psychological in thrust-had Durkheim not had earlier contact with the German social realists.
Durkheim's education, if we may judge from some philosophy lectures that Durkheim delivered in 1883-1884 (Gross and Jones 2004) , was very much the product of French social thought at his time.
Thus, whereas Durkheim appears to possess a solid French philosophical background with a particular proclivity for analytic detail, the philosophical stances encountered in these lectures reflect the (structuralist, reductionist, deductive) rationalism of René Descartes (1596 Descartes ( -1650 This would include the encyclopedicists Denis Diderot (1713-1784) and Jean le Rond d'Alembert (1717-1783), among others, who championed a more notably rationalist, structuralist, ahistorical, allegedly scientific approach.
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Although Aristotle is often described as an objectivist or raw empiricist and Plato as an idealist, these characterizations not only disregard particularly consequential pragmatist motifs in Plato's texts (Prus 2009a (Prus , 2011a (Prus , 2011b (Prus , 2013b Prus and Camara 2010) but also dismally fail to acknowledge the broader, more explicit nature of Aristotle's pragmatist approach to the study of the human condition (see: Nicomachean Ethics, Rhetoric, Politics, Poetics, and Categories; also see : Prus 2003; 2004; 2007a; 2008; 2009a; 2013a; 2013c; 2015; Prus and Camara 2010) . Over the millennia Aristotle's scholarship has been represented in many different ways and across highly diverse realms of community life, but it is Aristotelian pragmatism (see " Prus 1999; 2003; 2004; Puddephatt and Prus 2007 ) that provides the conceptual foundations of 20 th century American pragmatism (and pragmatism's sociological offshoot, symbolic interactionism), as well as the somewhat earlier German social realist tradition that Durkheim discusses. study leaves for promising young French scholars so that they might learn about the latest thought and research being developed in Germany.
Although many of his colleagues were notably disaffected with their study leave encounters in German academia, Durkheim (1993 Durkheim ( [1887 ) describes his contacts with particular German scholars as having given him a particularly clear conceptual paradigm and research agenda, as well as a much sharpened methodological standpoint for studying community life-and especially the matters of morality, regulation, and religion. As a result, the contrasts between Durkheim's (1883 Durkheim's ( -1884 lectures and the statement on morality that he developed in 1887 following his (1885-1886) study leave in Germany are particularly striking. Still, the sources of Durkheim's ideas, along with the nature of their influence, have become a point of controversy. 6 Drawing on Durkheim's 1887 paper, I will indicate his profound indebtedness to some German realists of whom Wilhelm Wundt (1832 -1920 ) is particularly consequential. 7 Indeed, Wundt and the German social realists Durkheim discusses seem foundational for Durkheim's (a) subsequent emphasis on the collective consciousness, (b) insistence on the essentiality of the group (as in language, interaction, concepts, and meaning) for all realms of human 6 Had Durkheim (1993 Durkheim ( [1887 ) explicitly defined German social realism as but a variant of the pragmatist philosophy associated with Plato and (especially) Aristotle, he might have had received a more tolerant reception in the French academic community. 7 knowing, acting, and interchange, (c) the notably relativist, pluralist humanist/pragmatist features of his subsequent sociological analyses, and (d) attentiveness to the developmental-historical flows-continuities and disjunctures-of community life.
In contrast to the position taken in the present statement, Steven Lukes (1973: especially 79-95) Hall (1993 ), Robert Alun Jones (1994 1999) , and Mustafa Emirbayer (1996a; 1996b) , would not concur with Lukes on this matter. 9 Readers may 8
In 1907, and seemingly responding to more public (published) allegations that his sociology was very much a restatement of German social thought rather than having been derived from French sources, Durkheim would say that the major sources for his ideas were Auguste Comte, Herbert Spencer, and (Spencer's student) Alfred Espinas (see : Lukes 1973:79-85) . Whereas this claim generally seems much more appropriate for Durkheim's earlier works (1947 Durkheim's earlier works ( [1893 1951 [1897 1958 [1895 ) than for his later scholarship, it notably disregards the interpretivist/pragmatist materials that Durkheim introduced in his 1890s texts.
Claims of these sorts also understate the interpretivist-positivist tensions that Durkheim seems likely to have experienced in developing these three texts. Also see Alexander (1986) , Emirbayer (1996a; 1996b) , and Jones (1999). Durkheim's conceptual continuities with German social realism become more apparent when one examines his 1902-1903, 1904-1905, 1912, 1913-1914 texts in the light of his 1887 statement.
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Part of the failure of Steven Lukes (1973 ), Marcel Fournier (2013 , and numerous other commentators to acknowledge the pragmatist features of Durkheim's work, as well as the connections of Durkheim with Wilhelm Wundt not only suggests a lack of awareness of Aristotle's pragmatism (Prus 2007a; 2008; 2013a; 2015) but also more direct familiarity with Wundt's Ethics-the primary source on which Durkheim built in his 1887 article. Still, given the many areas of social life in which Durkheim addressed during his life-time and the many statements he developed (published texts and articles, lectures, notes, correspondence), as well as the differing backgrounds and resources with which particular commentators have worked, significant diversity of emphases and interpretation seems inevitable. judge these viewpoints for themselves when they examine Durkheim's fuller (1993 Durkheim's fuller ( [1887 Pragmatist emphases pertaining to the nature of human group life and the relationship of the individual to society are prominent in Durkheim's later (1915 Durkheim's later ( [1912 1961 [1902 -1903 1977 [1904 -1905 1983 [1913 -1914 ) works. 11 However, the conceptual-analytic materials that can be gleaned from Emile
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Albeit considerably less evident, amidst the continuities of Durkheim's earlier exposure to French structuralism and positivist social thought, some noteworthy pragmatist motifs can be found in Durkheim's Division of Labor. Likewise, important features of Rules clearly reflect a pragmatist orientation to the study of human group life. By contrast, Durkheim's Suicide, which is often (mis)taken as Durkheim's "definitive methodological prototype," has very little to offer to the pragmatist study of human lived experience-including suicide as a socially engaged process embedded in the context of ongoing community life.
While appealing to "the remedial social problems mentality" of his time and corresponding searches for "structuralist factors and quick-fix solutions" of our own time, it is not apparent that Durkheim was conceptually or methodologically enchanted with Suicide. Still, Emile Durkheim had made long-term commitments to this project and, despite its substantial conceptual and methodological failings, he envisioned Suicide as a publication of considerable importance for his career.
Durkheim's "The Scientific Study of Morality in
Germany" constitute an "intellectual sociological treasure chest" in themselves.
Whereas readers may be struck by the extended, pronounced emphasis on the collective consciousness of the group that Durkheim discusses in his 1887 publication, this statement also represents a direct critique of Platonist, Cartesian, and Kantian rationalism. Moreover, Durkheim explicitly challenges the viability of utilitarianism and individualism as overarching rationalities for explaining the moral order of the community.
For the German social realists, the interaction that takes place in the community is central for enabling all that is humanly known and meaningfully engaged. Moreover, there is a sustained pragmatist emphasis on activity. The group achieves its viability as people do things and relate to others in linguistically-enabled, minded, and socially acknowledged purposive terms. Still, and no less consequentially, people's conceptions of knowing and acting (and the resources accumulated therein) not only are collectively developed, sustained, and transformed over time but these "cultural accomplishments" also are very much one with the viewpoints, activities, and interchanges that constitute ongoing community life. Accordingly, Durkheim (1993 Durkheim ( [1887 ) stresses (a) an attentiveness to the historical-developmental flows of human group life for comprehending the culture (as in traditions, knowledge, morality, and day-today practices) of the community and (b) the relativity of morality across societies, as well as within particular communities over time. Emile Durkheim also acknowledges (c) the problematic nature of community life-viewing emergence as an indefinite, ongoing socially engaged process that transcends the interests and viewpoints of particular individuals.
As well, (d) insofar as it is seen to epitomize the collective, reflective, enacted features of communityas a societal force or collective spirit that transcends the individuals within the community-morality is to be seen as a socially achieved process. It is for this reason that both religious and secular viewpoints and practices are to be given particular attention in developing a scholarly analysis of the moral ordering of community life.
Contending that (e) ongoing community life, rather than the physiological or psychological qualities of individuals, is the centering point of analysis for human knowing, activity, and interchange, Durkheim addresses (f) the importance of both meaningful, intentioned, and more collectively routinized activities and modes of association for the study of community life. Relatedly, he remains attentive to (g) the developmental, enacted interrelatedness and the associated resiliencies of the many humanly engaged theaters of operation that transcend more individualized, as well as more extended collective efforts to change aspects of community life. important for it provides a framework for studying ethics in more distinctively scientific terms.
Part I: Economists and Sociologists
Opening his discussion by considering the relation- In developing a fuller alternative to these first three views of economics and ethics, Durkheim (E&SM:62-68) draws on the German political economists Adolph Wagner and Gustav von Schmoller (1838 -1917 . Both challenge the utilitarian position that society exists to serve the interests of the individuals within. Invoking expressions such as "social conscience," "the collective spirit," and the like [which Durkheim describes as a current analytic emphasis in Germany], these two political economists argue that society is much more than the sum of its parts and is to be understood as a genuine unity unto itself.
Relatedly, all aspects of the economy, including the private economy, are to be seen as within the context of the collectivity. The economy, thus, is a social economy and can only be understood with respect to the particular community in which it functions and takes its shape. In contrast to those adapting notions of self-serving utilitarianism, Wagner and Schmoller contend that the realms of both economy and ethics incorporate elements of unselfishness and are mindful of differences between things "done for the good of the state" and "those pursued because of individual interests."
As well, since morality and economics are interfused in a great many realms of community life, it is necessary to comprehend some fundamental economic processes to understand community morality. Likewise, whereas economics represents only one arena in which matters of ethics may be invoked, economics is shaped by people's concerns with ethics, as well as the interests of particular individuals.
Then, after stating that the purpose of political economy is to explain the economic functioning of the (broader) social organism in which it is embedded, Durkheim (E&SM:66-67) says that economic phenomena, like all other matters of community life, are to be approached as developmental social processes.
Drawing directly on Schmoller, Durkheim explains
that as people begin to do things more consistently, those practices "begin to impose themselves on the participants" as habits. As they reach this stage, routinized practices assume more restrictive, compulsory, or obligatory qualities and, thereby, provide the foundations for mores and, subsequently, law and morality. People's economic activities also become crystallized in this fashion. Thus, amidst the changes and adjustments that take place over time, economic practices also become moral phenomena as people begin to establish particular ways of "doing business" and envision these as more entirely appropriate.
In contrast to those who treat economics and morality as if they were two separate worlds, Durkheim not only insists on the importance of attending to ways that economic practices enter into certain aspects of the moral order (e.g., property, contracts) but he also encourages analysts to be mindful of the ways in which people's broader notions of morality become infused with their economic arrangements.
Elaborating further on Wagner's work, Durkheim (E&SM:68-70) says that notions of individual liberty, ownership, and the like have no value or meaning in themselves. It is only within the context of the community that matters of these sorts assume any consequence.
Likewise, Durkheim says, it is inappropriate to start with some abstract principle of morality and proceed to deduce applications from this. Instead, following Schmoller, Durkheim insists that in order to comprehend the forms or principles of morality, it is necessary to observe people's actual practices and develop inferences from these instances. 12 Moreover, Durkheim states, morality would have no relevance as a detached, abstract concept. Notions of morality are meaningful only when these are linked to life in more direct, actively engaged terms.
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Durkheim makes no reference to Aristotle here. However, Aristotle contends that concepts (also forms, abstractions, generals) are derived from a comparative analysis of the instances in which things take place. Plato is not entirely consistent in his attentiveness to forms (and concepts). Thus, whereas Plato is highly attentive to the humanly, community-enabled, constructed nature of knowing, acting, and interchange in extended sectors of his texts (especially Republic and Laws; also see Prus 2009a; 2011a; 2011b; 2013b; Prus and Camara 2010) , he sometimes addresses forms and concepts as pre-existing matters. Aristotle clearly does not accept this latter position.
Viewing ethics as a "science of life," Durkheim (E&SM:70-73) stresses the point that it is humanity, actual lived humanity, as opposed to abstract principles, that is the subject matter of the study of ethics.
Then, addressing a related question of whether humans can effectively intervene in basic economic processes (which, Durkheim notes, are seen as immutable by the Manchester School), Durkheim takes the viewpoint that the economy has a broader social quality than the Manchester School recognizes. Still, Durkheim contends, these processes cannot simply be adjusted by people's intentions or by invoking particular instances of legislation as Wagner has suggested. Although economic processes do change, sometimes comparatively quickly, Durkheim says, social facts are complex, diffuse matters and cannot be adequately comprehended (and regulated) by human minds. It is this multiplistic set of processes and the lack of an overarching rationality that not only obscures scholarly analysis but that also frustrates policy interventions. ) then references the economist Albert Schaffle whose works shed more light on morality as a social process. Rather than viewing morality as a system of rules, Schaffle argues that morality represents a dynamic social function. Not only does morality take shape through a historically articulated collective process but the morality of the community also "adjusts" to the conditions of the collectivity.
Thus, in contrast to Wagner's assumption that morality can be intentionally adjusted through legislation, Schaffle views rules and policies more entirely as adjustive responses to collectively experienced Although accepting Schaffle's views about the limited effects of legislation on morality and that legislation reflects acknowledgements of changes to generally existing practices, Durkheim says that he is skeptical of Schaffle's claims that change within occurs because of direct, reflective, purposive behavior. In particular, Durkheim is reluctant to acknowledge the family as the central source of this artistic (architectural) morality and Schaffle's associated tendency to envision the family in more psychological terms.
Durkheim concludes this section of his text by ob-
serving that philosophy has undergone a major transformation in Germany. Whereas psychology with its linkages to physiology has largely broken away from philosophy, so also does the study of morality in Germany (thusly transformed by the economists) seem on its way to becoming a field of study on its own.
Part II: The Jurists, Rudolph Jhering
Continuing with this highly compacted set of essays on morality as a humanly engaged process, (1915 [1912]; 1961 [1902-1903]; 1977 [1904-1905]; 1983 [1913-1914]) , it is instructive to keep in mind that, following his studies in Germany, Durkheim had been criticized by French colleagues (of whom Simon Deploige seems particularly persistent) for being overly attentive to German social thought.]
After observing that that the authors he has discussed so far were moral philosophers in a more marginal sense, Durkheim (E&SM:89) says that it is Wilhelm Wundt (1832 Wundt ( -1920 who has synthesized the works of the other German moral theorists into a more coherent, focused process-oriented study of ethics. According to Wundt (E&SM:92) it is only by studying collective matters as instances of social psychology (die Völkerpsychologie) that one can hope to understand ethics. Because ethics is a social, historically achieved phenomenon, it is to be studied as a collective process. As well, individual consciousness (as in people's thoughts, concepts, and notions of individuality) is to be understood as emerging within the interchanges of group life-not as people with solitary-enabled realms of consciousness producing the concepts that inform and shape human group life.
The study of ethics, thus, becomes the history of community life-language, religion, customs, culture, activities and interchanges, restraint, freedoms and regulation, including people's experiences with the physical environment. Still, of these processes, Durkheim says, it is religion and customs that merit most sustained attention. that custom emerges as the product of individual practices, it is mistaken to think that custom, like language and religion, is somehow the product of individual consciousness. Indeed, although custom and other collective matters presume human capacities for consciousness, individual consciousness is the product of group consciousness.
Thus, insofar as humans linguistically participate in "the consciousness of the community," they become the recipients and beneficiaries (of viewpoints, practices, stocks of knowledge, and technologies) of the more enduring community life-worlds in which they find themselves. Still, even though it is people who sustain the prevailing practices and viewpoints of their own times, as individuals they typically have little direct, especially longer-term, influence on the overall collective life of the community.
As instances of collectively achieved group life, particular customs are to be explained through earlier collective practices and interchange. Further, although the bases on which specific customs emerged may long have disappeared from memory, these practices persist as phenomena carried forward in the culture of community life. Likewise, in tracing customs back over time, one only finds other collective phenomena in the form of customs, beliefs, and religious practices.
Referencing Wundt again, directly opposes those (probably referring to Hobbes and Rousseau) who contend that customs are the products of individual interests and that these only subsequently had been sanctified by religion.
By contrast, Durkheim says, customs are derived from religion rather than from configurations of individual interests and that it is these (religious) ideals and the superior powers that religion represents that enable things to become established as customs. It is religion that binds people together. It is religion that generates an altruism or concern with the other that extends beyond the individual. As well, even when particular customs lose more direct connections with religion, they still maintain some of this altruistic base of support.
It is for this reason too, Durkheim adds, that law and morality remain largely undifferentiated among less civilized peoples. Likewise, whereas customs and morality are essentially synonymous among primitive peoples, more civilized societies judge customs from moral standpoints. Although these latter sets of egoistic tendencies may seem to cancel out more genuine altruistic tendencies, Durkheim insists that altruism is not a disguised form of egoism. It is inappropriate to try to explain things (altruism) as functions of their opposites (egoism). Something more is needed. Also, as Durkheim reminds readers, the natural moral practices of the community do not reflect some longer-term calculations or reasoned objectives but emerge as part of a broader, more nebulous, adjustive process that assumes a reality well beyond people's intentions.
Commenting next on the matters of homogeneity
and division with respect to people's notions of morality, Durkheim (E&SM:100-102) says that the first societies would have been characterized by a single morality. However, people's notions of morali-ty would become increasingly diversified as various groups and categories of people become more distinct within. With an increase in the size of the community as well, morality also becomes more depersonalized (and presumably more autonomous).
In the process, Durkheim says, people's affinities with more particular sets of others become replaced with more general but still strong attachments to aspects of the broader community (e.g., art, customs, science) in which they are embedded-and thus ex- Still, Durkheim centrally emphasizes Wundt's law of heterogeneity of ends. At the core of this principle are the ideas that (1) even when people act voluntarily with particular ends in mind, their actions may generate consequences beyond any that they intended and (2) when people attend to these other effects and find these relevant in some way, they may begin to engage in the same activities, but now with these other effects in mind-thereby generating other objectives, motives, or purposes for the same acts; and (3) this process can continue indefinitely and takes people into increasingly extended realms of activity, meaning, and purpose. Relatedly, (4) because of this evolutionary (adjustive) process, people may subsequently engage in particular activities for very different reasons than those prompting the same behaviors at earlier points in time. Their activities (also meanings and purposes) also assume an emergent, unpredictable quality that goes well beyond any intentional or purposive ends or objectives.
Further, because of this set of processes, Durkheim continues, it is to be recognized that theory cannot be expected to match the emergent, unpredictable nature of humanly experienced reality. Because people cannot know the outcomes of their activities in this broader sense, the best they can do is anticipate the future in more general terms.
As a result, as well, deliberate thought and planning can assume only a small part in this evolutionary process for it is only after things have taken place and been experienced that people may define what has happened and judge their value as matters to be pursued further. Still, employing Wundt's reasoning, Durkheim says that if morality is derived from religion, it is because people have defined the things that emerge in religious contexts as denoting better approximations of their moral ideals. However, rather than individuals being the foundational base from which society is achieved Durkheim (with Wundt) stresses the point that only by slow degrees are people able to achieve a more extended separation of self from its group-based foundation.
Next, taking issue with universalists such as Hegel
and Schopenhauer, Durkheim (with Wundt) says that while people are so thoroughly indebted to society, it is essential to recognize that people also act back on (resist/challenge/reject aspects of) the very communities in which they are situated. Indeed, there have been some people whose capacities to formulate and express the ideas of their societies and times were so great that they have served as a "form of living conscience" for their communities.
As well, whereas most people may do nothing to alter their communities in any significant manner and instead largely perpetuate existing practices, it is important to acknowledge the changes that less prominent people may introduce in smaller segments of the community.
Concluding this broader introduction, Durkheim
says that it is important for scholars dealing with morality to be attentive to the interconnections of groups and the individuals who constitute these groups.
Then, turning more directly to "ethical goals," Durkheim (E&SM:108-111) begins to contrast Wundt's position with the Utilitarians and Rationalists who address ethics by arbitrarily prioritizing specific principles. Mindful of Wundt's position, Durkheim says it is essential to observe the things that specific communities (as collectivities) consider to be moral and attempt to ascertain the foundational emphases of these matters.
Following Wundt, Durkheim notes that the goals of people's actions can be individual (as in attending to oneself and one's more immediate associates), societal (community-oriented), or humanistic (in yet more generalized, encompassing terms). Still, there is nothing moral about doing things for oneself or even helping particular others in the community achieve their goals. Indeed, people's goals assume a moral essence only insofar as they are oriented towards others in more impersonal, generalized terms.
It is on this basis that societies, as essences unto themselves, became more worthy targets of moral activities. Observing that individuals, as individuals, are essentially inconsequential in the broader historical developments and futures of the human community, it is societies as more fundamental and enduring essences that merit love and devotion. It is human goals in this broader sense, particularly those directed towards humanity in more extended terms, that epitomize the ideals of moral action. Even so, Durkheim (following Wundt) observes these ideals will never be realized since people become aware of how these objectives might be better achieved only as Thus, regardless of whether actions are directed towards oneself or others, Wundt uses the term "motives of perception" to refer to cases in which things seem so clear and direct that people react more habitually or "without thinking." When things are more ambiguous or involve dilemmas of sorts and entail some reflection or deliberation (involving action pertaining to the self and/or the other), the term "motives of understanding" is applied. The third category of motives is yet more focused and revolves around the matter of pursuing activities in ways that are mindful of the broader ideals of humanity. Thus, although emphasizing the point that the broader spirit of humanity characterizes all moral motives, this latter "motive of reasoning" not only tends to be less common overall but assumes a nobler, reflective quality.
Observing that ethical goals are almost invariably envisioned in obligatory terms, Durkheim (E&SM:113-115) next engages "ethical norms." Although people often assign an imperative quality to ethical goals, Durkheim (following Wundt) says that it would be erroneous to suppose that there is some special element that automatically makes ethical goals seem universal and intractable. Indeed, not only have matters of ethics been subject to extended debate but the motives that imbue ethical goals with authority also have little to do with particular versions of ethical goals. The first of what Wundt terms "imperative motives" is that of fear of restraint, more specifically-material restraints. The second imperative motive reflects people's concerns with public opinion and its potential effects on them.
A third, somewhat nobler, imperative acknowledges people's concerns about doing something that has some longer-term effects. Thus, whereas evil acts are envisioned as more transitory, good activities are thought to have more enduring consequences. The fourth, less common and yet most noble motive is that which people assign to the contemplation of ethical goals as ends to be pursued for themselves.
In summarizing these notions from Wundt, Durkheim next outlines a taxonomy that suggests that ethical goals may be pursued through norms directed variously towards individuals, societies, and yet broader realms of humanity.
In writing a conclusion to his consideration of Wundt's Ethics, ) provides yet further insight into Wundt's work and the analysis of human knowing and acting.
Thus, in the process of observing that Wundt has synthesized much of the thought of the German (realist) theorists that Durkheim has earlier referenced, Durkheim (E&SM:115-116) contrasts Wundt's approach to ethics with that of Immanuel Kant. Consequentially, whereas Kant's "moral imperative" is precise, invariant, presumed clear to all, and implies a mystical quality, Wundt is attentive to the variable, emergent, adjustive, and unevenly acknowledged nature of human morality. Moreover, Wundt also approaches morality as a complex phenomenon that can be comprehended scientifically.
Speaking more generally, says that Wundt has advanced the analysis of ethics in two central ways. First, whereas most theorists have alleged that morality can be achieved as a philosophic process wherein one starts with a general principle and deductively arrives at a set of contingencies that promote social order, Wundt rejects this rationalist viewpoint and insists on developing a theory of mo-rality that is built centrally on observation of actual human practices and arrives at conceptions of ethics though the use of induction or comparative analysis.
Subjecting reason to observation of actual historical cases, Wundt emphasizes the importance of considering the fuller array of ends that particular actions produce and attending to morality as an emergent, adjustive, reflective process rather than focusing directly on the intentions of moral viewpoints.
Thus, beyond (a) the intentioned, conscious aspects of morality, the things that people do (b) also take them into areas that go beyond their consciousness and (c) these activities unintendedly or unwittingly generate other sets of processes that subsequently may impact on the things people do. As a result, people not only cannot know the longer-term effects of their own behaviors but, even as they act, they also are apt to be only partially cognizant of the fuller range of concerns, circumstances, and contingencies affecting their activities.
The second way that Wundt has made progress in the field of ethics is by focusing on ethics as a field amenable to scientific inquiry. Thus, while most theorists have envisioned variations in the ethical practices of different communities as more unique matters of artistic expression, Wundt intends to examine the ways that things have developed in this and that context for the explicit purpose of comparative analysis.
As well, Durkheim notes, whereas all of the moral theorists he has discussed assume that the primary function of morality is to enable people to deal with one another more effectively and thus insure the survival of the group, Wundt observes this moderating effect takes place inadvertently and is best known after the fact (as opposed to representing a reason for invoking morality).
The primary function of morality, Wundt contends, is to make the individuals who constitute the community realize that they are not the whole or centering point of the society. Instead, they are only part of the whole and, as individuals, people are comparatively insignificant relative to the larger community.
It is the recognition of the importance of the community-based other that makes society possible. Morality, thus, reflects the efforts of people to locate themselves in something that is more substantial, more enduring than themselves.
Continuing, ) says that although society reflects this quest for "something more enduring" to which people might attach themselves, one still must ask from whence morality derives its authority or obligatory quality.
In developing a response, Durkheim says that if one puts aside religious obligations associated with divinity and also the social discipline associated with the potency of the community, then nothing is left. As Durkheim later observes, Wundt is making a teleological assumption here-that there is a single, rational morality to which all humanity consciously and unconsciously strives. This does not invalidate the exceptionally potent sociological quality of Wundt's earlier analysis but draws attention to some is because of the more distinctive nature of religion and morality among civilized peoples that these more sharply delineated variants represent instructive departure points for subsequent observation and analysis of religion and morality as social essences.
Nevertheless, Durkheim notes, there are as many moralities as there are peoples and that the moralities of all peoples are to be recognized as viable relative to their own place and time. Likewise, each community sets its own goods or ideals to which it strives until changes occur and community moralities are readjusted as new ideals to be approximated. Further, although the actual principles emphasized in the rationalist approaches of Kant and other intuitivists differ from those of Mill and the utilitarians, Durkheim says that both rely extensively on deductive methods. As well, since pure logic can make no claims whatsoever about content, both the rationalists and the utilitarians invariably build on some notions of experience. In these respects, the differences between the two are not as great as might first seem.
Still, the more central failing of both sets of approaches, Durkheim stresses, is that they are not scientific.
First, it is not apparent that ethics can be reduced to a simple motivating concept or principle. Likewise, pure logic (reasoning on its own) cannot establish ethical principles. Relying on external inferences, both sets of claims failed to examine the actualities, diversities, and complexities of social life.
If one is to acquire viable knowledge of people's ethics, it will be necessary to examine the particulars in highly sustained detail. It is not adequate to build on observations of more superficial sorts and it is entirely inappropriate to apply deductive logic to more complex phenomena. Because of the sheer complexity of moral phenomena, deductive reasoning is entirely inappropriate. Reason simply cannot substitute for sustained observation.
Continuing, ) says that it is precisely because of the failings of the prevailing approaches to ethics that the German school, with its genuinely inductive method, is so consequential.
Providing an alternative to the transcendental logic of the Kantians that ignores scientific observation, as well as vague Utilitarian references to experience, the German (realist) school approaches ethics not only as a distinct field on its own but also one that is to be empirically investigated.
Elaborating further, Durkheim says that ethics has its own subject matter and, like other fields of scientific inquiry, is to be built on observations, analysis, and progressive comparisons in the quest to inductively arrive at a general set of principles. Further, because of its subject matter, Durkheim adds, ethics is not to be viewed as a simple extension of psychology or sociology but is to be established as an independent discipline in the social sciences.
Referencing two other sources (a British historian Leslie Stephen and a German economist and political scientist Lorenz von Stein ) who also have contributed to this emergent German tradition, Durkheim (E&SM:128-129) briefly, but directly engages "evolution" as a community-oriented concept.
Observing that all of those he has identified with the German school envision morality as developing in evolutionary terms, Durkheim says that it is essential to recognize that they are working with a very different conception of evolution than that associated with evolution as a biological process.
It is necessary, he says, to be mindful of the limitations of the biological analogy and not presuppose, as the (Italian) criminologists have done, that matters of morality can be explained in biological terms.
Instead, insists, morality is to be approached as an independent field of study, as those in the German school have done. Nevertheless, he states, their methodology requires subRedefining the Sociological Paradigm: Emile Durkheim and the Scientific Study of Morality stantial modification. Thus, despite the conceptual insights generated by the German school, their theory is still too general. Also, like the Kantians and Utilitarians, the German school is still preoccupied with the quest for an overarching moral principle. 17 Stating that none of the prevailing sciences can be reduced to a single principle or problem, Durkheim says that it is necessary to approach the study of morality in more explicitly open, inquisitive, detailed terms. Indeed, he says, it is premature to seek out overarching principles when there is so much to be learned about morality as a phenomenon. Likewise, it is to be recognized that morality is not a science in itself, but instead is to be approached as the subject matter of scientific inquiry.
Although conceding that some of the German scholars he has referenced have embarked on more sustained studies of the sort he is encouraging, Durkheim text, not only lack the resources necessary to develop adequate analytic comparisons but typically become so engrossed in fitting the details of their situations together that they forego interest in moving beyond their more immediate frames of reference.
As a result, it will be the task of the moral theorist to develop analytic comparisons by building on these materials. Noting that this will be a demanding role to pursue in more comprehensive terms, Durkheim says that these scholars still may be able to develop a more limited set of comparisons at any time. Indeed, this seems necessary given the more idiographic, self-serving approaches adapted by most historians.
Durkheim (E&SM:134-135) concludes his statement
by stating that the "science of morality" is only in a rudimentary state and will require patience, as well as perseverance for its fuller development.
After noting that some people are apt to find it disconcerting to realize that matters of morality have an emergent, often obscure quality that defies rationalism (presumably of both Kantian and Utilitarian sorts) and related applications of deductive logic, Durkheim says that the moralities that particular peoples have developed are to be appreciated for achieving a wisdom that surpasses that of the greatest genius.
Then, stating that we are a long way from knowing enough to define and regulate human morality (and that it is childish to suppose otherwise), Durkheim says that it is by drawing on the lessons of history that we may arrive at more viable, more informed conceptions of human morality. Indeed, morality is to be understood within the parameters of human history.
In Perspective
Although generally unknown in academic circlesnotably including sociology, Emile Durkheim's (1993 Durkheim's ( [1887 [1895])-even as he worked his way through these materials and endeavored to accommodate the paradigmatic structuralist/pragmatist discrepancies.
Still, as a young scholar intensely pursuing an academic career and dependent on his associates for confirmations thereof, Durkheim's challenge would be one of acceptably fitting his work into mainstream French social thought while sustaining essential intellectual continuities with the (pragmatist) sociological framework he outlined in 1887. By contrast, most of his later (1902) (1903) (1904) (1905) (1906) (1907) (1908) (1909) (1910) (1911) (1912) (1913) (1914) ) materials exhibit a pronounced attentiveness to pragmatist social thought.
It is worth noting, as well, that in his 1902-1914 works Durkheim seldom acknowledges the existence of the 1893, 1895, 1897 texts for which he is still best known in sociology. Instead, consistent with his 1887 paper, Emile Durkheim (1902 Durkheim ( -1914 contends that the principal methodological resources of sociology are history and ethnography.
Redefining the Sociological Paradigm: Emile Durkheim and the Scientific Study of Morality Relatedly, there is the more explicit emphasis on attending to the flows of community life, envisioning activity and interchange as meaningful, socially interconnected sets of processes to be best comprehended through sustained comparative analysis. Durkheim will emphasize the centrality of the group throughout his career, but in his later works (as with his 1887 paper), it is the community as consisting of developmentally interfused arenas of meaningfully engaged activity and interchange (not abstracted sets of factors or variables) that he defines as particularly consequential.
Even though references to Wilhelm Wundt and the other German social realist theorists Durkheim discusses in his 1887 statement are notably absent in his later works, it appears that Wilhelm Wundt has been Durkheim's (and hence also our own) long-term intellectual companion.
Albeit inadvertently, in developing his 1887 paper, Durkheim also helps establish the links between classical Greek thought and our own time (Prus 2004; 2007a; 2015; 2017) . Durkheim seems largely inattentive to the Greek (predominantly Aristotelian) foundations of German social realist thought, even as he explicitly builds on Wundt's historically informed analysis of the study of morality (Ethics). Thus, whereas Wundt makes direct reference to Aristotle in developing Ethics, Durkheim has focused more exclusively on the processes by which morality takes shape and (relatedly) approaches the study of morality as denoting emergent sets of social processes that are essential for comprehending all realms of community life. 18 18 It may be observed that Durkheim makes explicit reference to the centrality of Aristotle's Categories for human knowing and acting (and survival) Nevertheless, Durkheim has absorbed much of the intellectual tradition that Wundt articulates in Ethics. Moreover, later, in tracing the developmental flow of education and scholarship from the classical Greek era to his own time, Durkheim's (1977 Durkheim's ( [1904 Durkheim's ( -1905 (1961 [1902-1903] ), The Evolution of Educational Thought (1977 Thought ( [1904 Thought ( -1905 
), The Elementary
Forms of the Religious Life (1915 [1912] ), and Pragmatism and Sociology (1983 [1913 -1914 ). By examining Durkheim's (1993 Durkheim's ( [1887 ) statement on German realism, we begin more fully to appreciate the foundations of his later (1902) (1903) (1904) (1905) (1906) (1907) (1908) (1909) (1910) (1911) (1912) (1913) (1914) ) "sociological pragmatism" along with its implications both for reorienting the sociological venture more generally and extending pragmatist (and interactionist) scholarship more specifically.
This latter (1902) (1903) (1904) (1905) (1906) (1907) (1908) (1909) (1910) (1911) (1912) (1913) (1914) Like Wilhelm Wundt, who prior to adapting a historical, pragmatist approach had experienced considerable success as an experimental psychologist, Emile Durkheim was unable to subsequently redirect the flows of sociological analysis as much as he (1887, (1902) (1903) (1904) (1905) (1906) (1907) (1908) (1909) (1910) (1911) (1912) (1913) (1914) had intended. This appears to have reflected (a) the long-standing rationalist, structuralist emphases of the broader academic community, (b) the more mechanistic, ahistorical scientistic emphasis of most 17 th -20 th century social theorists, and (c) the ever-present quest for solutions to the "social problems of the day" and the associated academic positions and resources available to those who could more effectively make claims to facilitate scientifically informed solutions. 
